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Introduction 
 
 
United Nations Peacekeeping and the 
Use of Force 
The Intervention Brigade in Congo Is No Model for Success 
Denis M. Tull 
The number of uniformed personnel serving in UN peace missions reached a new 
record in 2016, at almost 123,000. Following grave failings of UN missions in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, there is growing awareness with-
in the UN of a widening disjoint between the expectations placed upon peacekeeping 
forces and what they can actually achieve. One aspect of the debate relates to the ques-
tion of how robustly UN missions should operate in enforcing their mandate. In some 
quarters the resolute use of force is seen as the key to greater success. Almost three 
years ago the UN sent a Force Intervention Brigade to Congo with an explicit mandate 
to neutralise armed groups. An assessment of its record reveals that the brigade cannot 
be regarded as an organisational model worth replicating, and that peace-enforcing 
mandates do not necessarily lead to greater success in peacekeeping. 
 
Three years ago, on 28 March 2013, the UN 
Security Council decided to send a 3,096-
member Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) 
to eastern DR Congo (Resolution 2098). The 
move came in response to persistent dif-
ficulties in establishing peace in the region 
after the March 23 Movement (M23) was 
able to capture North Kivu’s provincial 
capital Goma in November 2012, unhin-
dered by UN forces. 
Resolution 2098 broke new ground in 
several respects. Firstly, “on an exceptional 
basis and without creating a precedent or 
any prejudice to the agreed principles of 
peacekeeping”, an intervention force with 
its own separate remit was created within an 
ongoing UN mission, namely, MONUSCO 
(Mission de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies pour la Stabilisation en République 
Démocratique du Congo). Despite claims 
to the contrary, this represented the aban-
donment of the principle of mission impar-
tiality. The FIB was to conduct “targeted 
offensive operations” jointly with the Con-
golese army (Forces Armées de la Répu-
blique Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) to 
disarm militias and rebel forces and thus 
lessen the threat such groups posed to the 
civilian population and “state authority”. 
Despite its separate mandate, the FIB is part 
of MONUSCO and answerable to its force 
commander. On 30 March 2016 the Secu-
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rity Council extended the FIB’s mandate for 
the third time. 
Assessing the impact of the FIB means 
answering two questions. Firstly, can the 
coexistence of the FIB and the conventional 
UN mission serve as a model for future mis-
sions? And secondly, does greater robust-
ness – critics speak of militarisation – prom-
ise greater success in peacekeeping? 
FIB’s Balance Sheet 
The brigade passed its only real test to date 
in October 2013, just three months after 
arriving in Congo, when it defeated the 
M23 in a military offensive conducted jointly 
with the FARDC. Hopes that this would 
lead to the neutralisation of other militias 
and a general stabilisation of the region 
were not to be fulfilled. The situation in 
eastern Congo remains characterised by 
violence and persistent armed attacks on 
the civilian population. 
Why did the FIB intervention fail to 
mark a turning point? Its success against 
the M23 was not a good yardstick of its 
influence on the overall security situation. 
Firstly, the defeat of the M23 was only par-
tially attributable to military force. Massive 
international pressure on neighbouring 
Rwanda to abandon its support for the 
rebels played an equally important role. 
Secondly, while the M23 may have been 
eastern DRC’s strongest group in military 
terms – and the greatest threat to the gov-
ernment of President Joseph Kabila – the 
Congo Research Group listed eighty-one 
armed organisations in the two Kivu prov-
inces at the end of 2015. If the FIB had been 
able to repeat its initial success against 
other militias (including the Forces Démo-
cratiques de Libération du Rwanda [FDLR] 
and the Allied Democratic Forces [ADF]), 
it would have been able to improve the 
situation in eastern Congo at least in the 
short term. But the momentum of the 
offensive against M23 quickly dissipated. 
Operations against other groups either 
fizzled out (ADF) or never occurred at all, 
as in the case of the FDLR, the largest 
remaining militia in eastern Congo with 
1,000 to 2,500 fighters. 
The reasons for the FIB’s meek record are 
political rather than military in nature. Its 
origins play a role. The idea to establish an 
intervention force came not from the UN, 
but from Tanzania and South Africa as rep-
resentatives of the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC). Their inten-
tion was to rid their ally Kabila of his worst 
tormentor, the M23. To that extent the ini-
tiative was also directed indirectly against 
the M23’s regional protector Rwanda, whose 
relations with South Africa and Tanzania 
are strained. The UN was greatly concerned 
about the idea of a regional intervention in 
its own area of operations, and the compro-
mise of integrating the FIB in MONUSCO 
originated in efforts to rein in that initia-
tive. However, this arrangement neither pre-
vented regional rivalries from overshadow-
ing the FIB, nor could it alter the fact that 
the countries behind the FIB never intended 
to do more than suppress the M23. In other 
words, the limited results of three years of 
the FIB merely reflect the limited goals of 
its initiators. After the neutralisation of the 
M23, the Kabila government also lost its 
briefly heightened interest in closer co-
operation with the UN. MONUSCO found 
itself – as it has consistently since 2006 – 
in the role of the unpopular and politically 
marginalised bystander. 
Even if the FIB had functioned as 
MONUSCO’s enforcement tool, its impact 
would have remained modest on account 
of its lack of integration in a viable political 
strategy. In fact, the FIB mandate was cer-
tainly compatible with MONUSCO’s. In 
pursuit of its objective of “stabilising” Con-
go, MONUSCO has for years prioritised 
supporting the FARDC against the militias, 
alongside its work of strengthening state 
institutions. The solution to the problem of 
violent conflict is seen to lie in establishing 
the state’s monopoly on the use of force. 
This approach, however, has brought at 
best limited success, including in relation 
to the top priority of the MONUSCO man-
date, the protection of civilians (PoC). 
SWP Comments 20 
April 2016 
3 
What were the UN’s assumptions under-
lying the stated aim of neutralising? Trans-
ferring “liberated areas” to Congo’s largely 
dysfunctional state authorities has not 
turned out to be a promising solution. To 
this day, the government demonstrates 
little interest in demands – repeated ad 
libitum by donors and the UN – to reform 
the security sector. Army and police are 
ineffectual, and often no less brutal than 
the armed groups. In October 2015, for 
example, the FARDC was responsible for 
twice as many human rights violations as 
the “worst” non-state militia. The state 
of the judiciary is little better. Both with 
respect to the overarching objective (sta-
bility) and the priority of the mandate (PoC) 
there is to date no convincing evidence to 
suggest that MONUSCO and the Congolese 
government have compatible interests. 
The fact that MONUSCO has suspended its 
military support for the FARDC for more 
than a year on the grounds of the latter’s 
human rights violations, and that the 
Kabila government continues to insist on 
the mission’s withdrawal, suggest the 
opposite. 
The FIB: Valium for MONUSCO 
The FIB’s deployment led to a series of 
unexpected negative consequences. 
The coexistence of two mandates, with 
diverging interpretations and approaches, 
caused frictions and rivalries and ulti-
mately prevented an effective cooperation 
between the FIB and MONUSCO. 
The most important unexpected conse-
quence of the FIB operation was that parts 
of MONUSCO’s contingents (the so-called 
framework brigades) fell into apathy, 
whether because they now regarded the 
FIB as the force responsible for active and 
robust peacekeeping, or because the M23 
as the most important armed group had 
been eliminated. To their alarm, the mission 
leadership soon realised that the already 
weak willingness of the framework bri-
gades to interpret their mandate actively 
and robustly had largely evaporated. Pas-
sive, static and at best reactive behaviour 
led to a widely noted “garrison mentality” 
among the framework brigades. The de 
facto refusal of these contingents to imple-
ment the “proactive” interpretation of the 
mandate demanded by MONUSCO’s civil-
ian and military leadership (including 
frequent patrols, also at night, greater vis-
ibility in high-risk areas, checkpoints) – up 
to and including refusal to obey orders – 
generated considerable conflict between 
the mission leadership and the framework 
brigades and between the framework bri-
gades and the FIB. 
MONUSCO leadership’s hopes that the 
FIB’s aggressive mandate would reinvigor-
ate the mission as a whole proved fruitless. 
This is clearly revealed in the case of protec-
tion of civilians. While the mission leader-
ship (mirroring the FIB mandate) believed 
that civilians had to be protected through 
an aggressive stance towards armed groups, 
MONUSCO’s North Kivu Brigade continued 
to insist on a more static approach, known 
as “protection by presence”, which relied 
on a multitude of small bases distributed 
throughout the territory. This approach 
is widely regarded as a failure, due to the 
limited resources and the huge geograph-
ical area. This passivity exacerbated 
MONUSCO’s credibility problem. On the 
ground this generated increasing criticism 
and even protests against the mission. 
Another problem that arose with the 
FIB was political disagreement within the 
mission over the question of which armed 
groups to target in FIB military operations, 
following the successful neutralisation of 
the M23 (FDLR, ADF etc.). 
Conclusion 
In the case of the FIB in Congo, the question 
of whether (even) more robust peacekeep-
ing also means more successful peacekeep-
ing is likely to be answered in the negative: 
Not because the FIB energetically pursued 
the objective of “enforcing peace” and failed, 
but because political problems quickly 
piled up to an extent that called into ques-
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tion the feasibility and wisdom of such an 
approach. The most important of these was 
the diverging interests of the protagonists – 
the Congolese government, the FIB troop 
contributors and MONUSCO – which could 
be expected to recur in similar form in 
other cases. Another problem that emerged 
was the interests of the traditional troop-
providing countries, most of which oppose 
a “militarisation” of UN peacekeeping on 
account of the risks associated with robust 
peacekeeping. In ongoing operations these 
countries and their troops decide them-
selves how much force they are prepared 
to use, regardless of what the mandate and 
the UN Secretariat tell them. This issue is 
unlikely to be resolved. The often-repeated 
suggestion that Security Council members 
should involve troop contributors more 
strongly in formulating mandates, in order 
to achieve more realistic mandates and 
more binding implementation, will not 
change that. 
In any case, Chapter VII mandates, which 
legitimise the use of military force, already 
grant MONUSCO and other peace missions 
adequate possibilities to defend their man-
date actively and robustly, even against 
armed groups. The creation of the FIB points 
instead more to the problem of inadequate 
implementation of mandates by peace op-
erations, rather than evidence of the con-
sequences of the lack of a mandate for the 
use of force. 
There is still need for a clarifying debate 
over the appropriate measure of robustness 
in peacekeeping, and how this should be 
implemented. A greater degree of robust-
ness is no doubt necessary in some circum-
stances. But the idea that greater use of 
force will automatically solve the persistent 
problems of peacekeeping is an illusion. 
The causes of the situation in Congo – per-
sistent violence, the existence of numerous 
armed groups and an ineffectual state – are 
political. They need to be understood and 
tackled as an interconnected set of factors. 
Unfortunately, the present trend in peace-
keeping is in the opposite direction, namely 
to isolate individual problems from their 
political context. This is reflected for 
example in the almost excessive attention 
given by UN missions to the question of 
what they can do themselves to protect 
civilians (and other priority tasks). This is 
not to downgrade the importance of PoC. 
MONUSCO has generated important inno-
vations in that respect, some of which will 
be emulated elsewhere. Unfortunately, 
however, they only tackle symptoms, and 
ineffectively. It would be more promising 
to ask what MONUSCO and other missions 
can do to influence the political environ-
ment such that civilian populations live in 
greater security. Then one would arrive at 
answers that direct attention more strongly 
towards political and institutional pro-
cesses and towards local ownership – and 
thus also towards the government of the 
host state, an actor that is a partner as well 
as part of the problem (see also South Sudan). 
If, as in Congo, even repeated attempts 
by a mission to influence political processes 
fail in the face of resistance by local actors, 
including the government, focussing on 
military aspects is nothing but a diversion. 
As such, it would appear advisable to return 
to the question of finding appropriate politi-
cal strategies that can potentially be sup-
ported using robust means (should). In that 
context the relatively new UN concept of 
“stabilisation” has not proven to be useful. 
Neither in MONUSCO nor within the UN 
system as a whole would there appear to 
be a shared understanding of what stabili-
sation means. The concept should either be 
concretised or abandoned. 
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